Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. v. Woods Cross City : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Golden Eagle Oil Refinery, Inc. v. Woods Cross
City : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael Z. Hayes; Mazuran and Hayes; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Gregory M. Simonsen; Alexander Dushku; Bryan H. Booth; Kirton and McConkie; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Golden Eagle Oil Refinery v. Woods Cross City, No. 20001010 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3007
MLtU 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN 0 6 2001 
-BauiefiaStagg-
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN EAGLE OIL REFINERY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20001010-CA 
Civil No. 990700470 
Second District Court, Davis County 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Davis County, Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Mazuran & Hayes 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Alexander Dushku (#7712) 
Bryan H. Booth (#7471) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Oral Argument and Published Decision 
Requested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLDEN EAGLE OIL REFINERY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 20001010 - CA 
Civil No. 990700470 
Second District Court, Davis County 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Final Order of the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Davis County, Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Mazuran & Hayes 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Alexander Dushku (#7712) 
Bryan H. Booth (#7471) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Oral Argument and Published Decision 
Requested 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
REPLY TO FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. On Appeal this Court Accords No Deference To The Trial Court; 
The City Has The Burden of Proving Termination Of A 
Nonconforming Use 5 
II. Utah Law Construes Zoning Ordinances Narrowly; Broad Statements 
of Intent Cannot Substitute For The Substantive Provisions Of 
The Ordinance 6 
III. The City Fails To Address The Fact That Golden Eagle's Operations -
Including Its Storage Tanks - Are A Single Nonconforming Use 9 
IV. The Storage Tanks Were Continuously In Use 10 
V. The Removal Of The Old Storage Tanks To Comply With State 
Environmental Regulations Did Not Constitute A "Cessation of 
Use" Under The Woods Cross City Ordinance 13 
VI. The Certified Tanks Did Not Enlarge, Extend, or Change Golden 
Eagle's Nonconforming Use And Therefore Must Be Permitted 
Under the Ordinance 16 
VII. In The Alternative, The Certified Tanks Must Be Allow As An 
Accessory Use 19 
VIII. The Rule Golden Eagle Proposes Is Narrow And Will Not Materially 
Disrupt The City's Land Use Goals 21 
CONCLUSION 22 
- l -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
A. L. Carrithers & Son v. City of Louisville, 63 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1933) 15 
Application and Appeal of O'Neal, 92 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1956) 14, 15 16, 22 
Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) 8 
Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) 6, 7 
Cardillo v. South Bethany, No. 86A-N02, 86C-OC23, 86M-OC8, 
1991 De. Super. LEXIS 222, (Del. Super. 1991) 8 
Chanhassen Estates Residents Assoc, v. City ofChanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 
335 (Minn. 1984) 8 
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Inverness, 735 N.E.2d 686 
(111. App. Ct. 2000) 8 
City of Tulsa v. Mizel, 265 P.2d 496 (Okla. 1953) 8 
Derby Refining Company v. City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1990) . . . 17, 18, 22 
DeKalb Co. v. Post Apartment Homes, L.P., 506 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) 8 
Denomme v. Mowry, 557 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1989) 9 
Forest City v. Payson, 239 A.2d 167 (Me. 1968) 8 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967) 10 
Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 320 
.(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 18, 20, 21 
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281, 988 P.2d 456 7 
In re: Fairhope Bd. of Adj. and Appeals, 567 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. 1990) 8 
Keller v. City ofBellingham, 600 P.2d 1276 (Wash. 1979) 18 
-ii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mossman v. City ofColombus, 449 N.W.2d 214 (Ne. 1989) 16 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) 5 
New Orleans v. Benchabbat, 566 So. 626 (La. 1990) 8 
New Orleans v. Elms, 566 So. 2d 626 (La. 1990) 5 
Patterson v. Utah County Bel. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 
(Utah App. 1995) 6, 7 
Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. App. 1944) 16 
State v. City of Nashville, 343 S.W.2d 847 (Term. 1961) .9 
State v. Lum, 807 P.2d 40 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) 8 
Sunnyside Up Corp. v. City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Bd., 739 A.2d 
644 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) 8 
Thomas v. Crescent City, 503 So.2d 1299 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987) 8 
Tillery v. Meadows Construction Co., 681 S.W.2d 330 (Ark. 1984) 8 
Township of Fremont v. McGarvie, 417 N.W.2d 560 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) 8 
V-l Oil v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 904 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1995) 11 
Whistler v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 741 P.2d 422 (Mont. 1987) 8 
Zickefoose v. Bd. of Zoning App. Green Township, No. 99-COA-01307, 
2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4122, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2000) 8 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-7-3 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-7-5 6 
Woods Cross City Ordinances § 12-2-103 19 
-iii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INTRODUCTION 
In the Brief of Appellee, the City fails to engage the central issues of this case and the 
powerful precedent Golden Eagle has adduced to support its position. Boiled down, the 
City's argument is basically that the District Court must have been correct because any other 
outcome would conflict with the broad intent language in the City's Ordinance. As did the 
District Court in its decision, the City on appeal employs such language as a solvent to 
dissolve any doctrinal, factual, or equitable difficulties posed by its unreasonably harsh 
interpretation of the Ordinance - an interpretation which the City's own planning 
commission unanimously declined to adopt. 
The City's approach is untenable. Utah law is clear that broad statements of intent do 
not vest city councils and reviewing courts with the discretion to disregard the plain meaning 
of specific provisions in city ordinances. Indeed, it is well established that zoning 
ordinances, including those concerning nonconforming uses, are strictly construed in favor 
of the property owner. Any ambiguity or uncertainty in the Ordinance must be interpreted 
in favor of Golden Eagle. 
The core issues in this case center on the meaning of specific provisions in the 
Ordinance in light of State law and the demands of basic due process. The City essentially 
ignores the large body of compelling precedent, some from this Court, interpreting such 
provisions or analogous language. This Court should not follow suit. Application of this 
Court's own precedent and respect for the well reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions 
under closely analogous facts, as well as a commonsense approach to the facts and the text 
of the Ordinance at issue in this case, can only lead to the conclusion that the District Court 
-1 . 
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erred in its decision. 
REPLY TO FACTUAL MISSTATEMENTS 
The City's Statement of Facts accurately sets forth many (though not all) of the key 
facts in this case, providing appropriate citations to the record. The only clarification 
necessary relates to paragraph 5, where the City states that "none of the diesel sludge and/or 
water in the Old Tanks was used by Golden Eagle in its operations." Brief of Appellee 
("City Brf"), p. 3, Tf 5. It is true that Golden Eagle did not reprocess the used petroleum 
product in the Old Tanks. But, as Golden Eagle set forth in its opening brief without any 
challenge from the City, the storage of used petroleum product is not a separate operation or 
separate nonconforming use but an integral part of Golden Eagle's overall operations which 
exist as a legal nonconforming use. Brief of Appellant ("Brf. App."), pp. 6-7. 
In the argument section of its brief, however, the City makes a number of bald factual 
assertions which are either misleading or have no support whatsoever in the record: 
1. Statement: "Significantly, during all this time, Golden Eagle continuously used 
other storage tanks on the Property for storage of used oil products that were to be recycled 
by Golden Eagle." City Brf, p. 11. 
Response: The City provides no citation to the record to support this statement. 
The intended implication appears to be that, in contrast to the Old Tanks, all "other storage 
tanks on the Property" were used in the recycling operations, as opposed to just for storage 
of use petroleum products. There is no record support for any such implication. 
2. Statement: "[T]he Old Tanks which were replaced by Golden Eagle played no 
part in their operations from at least 1993 to the present date . . . ." City Brf, p. 13. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Response: This statement gives a false impression. While it is true that the 
used petroleum product in the Old Tanks was not rotated out for over a year, Golden Eagle's 
"operations" include the storage of used petroleum product not only for recycling but also 
for ultimate disposal when recycling is not possible. See Brf. App., pp. 6-7. 
3. Statement: "In truth, the installation of the Certified Tanks has nothing to do 
with regulations of the State Department of Environmental Quality and everything to do with 
current market conditions. Because of increased demand for re-recyled [sic] oil products, 
Golden Eagle wanted to increase its used oil storage capacity." City Brf., p. 16. 
Response: These statements find absolutely no support in the record. As set 
forth in Golden Eagle's opening brief, Golden Eagle was directly supervised by the 
Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") in its endeavors to clean up the Property. 
Brf. App., pp. 9-10. An important element of the approved clean-up "plan [was] to replace 
these older storage tanks with new tanks." R. App. at 82. David Wheeler, a DEQ official 
overseeing Golden Eagle's efforts, stated in his March 9, 1999 Used Oil Inspection Report 
that "[fjuture improvements include . . . getting new tanks . . . . " Id. (emphasis added). The 
City's assertion that "installation of the Certified Tanks has nothing to do with regulations 
of the State Department of Environmental Quality" is absurd. According to the undisputed 
evidence in the record, the only reason Golden Eagle went to the huge expense and trouble 
of installing the Certified Tanks was to comply with State regulations. See Brf. App., pp. 
7-12. It is pure speculation for the City to assert that the actual motive behind the installation 
of the new tanks was Golden Eagle's desire to "increase its used oil storage capacity" due 
to "current market conditions;" the record says no such thing. To the contrary, as the City 
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itself concedes in its Statement of Facts, replacing the Old Storage Tanks with the Certified 
Tanks did not "increase" Golden Eagle's storage capacity but rather reduced it by 86,000 
gallons. See City Brf, p. 3, f 6. 
4. Statement: "If allowed to use [the Certified Tanks], Golden Eagle's operations 
on the site will, in fact, expand. More importantly, the life of Golden Eagle's nonconforming 
use will be significantly extended . . . ." City Brf., p. 17. 
Response: The record provides no support for such assertions. The City 
adduced no evidence whatsoever that there would be any expansion of Golden Eagle's 
operations due to the Certified Tanks. There is no evidence in the record of any additional 
impact of any sort on neighboring properties due to the Certified Tanks; indeed, the evidence 
indicates that negative impacts will be reduced since an environmental hazard would be 
eliminated and the tanks placed further away from the adjacent properties. See Brf. App., 
pp. 11-12; R. App. at 85-86. And there is no evidence in the record that Golden Eagle's 
overall nonconforming use will be "significantly extended" due to the Certified Tanks. The 
City's assertion to the contrary is merely speculation. The only relevant evidence in the 
record is that Golden Eagle's storage capacity has been reduced by the installation of the 
Certified Tanks. See City Brf, p. 3, \ 6. 
5. Statement: "Similarly, in this case, Golden Eagle's installation of the Certified 
Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity." City Brf, 
p. 20. 
Response: This statement is false. As the undisputed evidence established-
and as the City's own Statement of Facts confirms - replacement of the Old Tanks with the 
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Certified Tanks reduced Golden Eagle ' s physical storage capacity by 86,000 gallons. See 
City Br f , p 3, f 6; see also Br i: / Vpp , pj: , 11 12; R \pp •. at 85-36 i Vs dei t: icn isti atedt c lo\ v, 
' \\;y V. : :• \ • an iilake such an argument is through verbal gymnastics and circular 
reasoning. 
ARGUMENT 
X. ^ Ml \ j . \ C C Q r C i " ' * * i i i i L i i ^ l i w i l i t i : • «i_i_ \ _i#_ui i* » * * v.. _ \ . J l J 'it*.! 
[I ju? Jj >__._. . . . . . . , ..ig T e r m i n a t i o n Of A N o n c o n f o r m i n g Use, 
The City repeatedly argues that the District ( HUM iade certain determinations wlrich 
tins Court s ! w d J uphold Sec, e.g., Citv Brf . vp I 1 - 1 " i n o l - ? ° h nears emphasis that 
l l i r •• - ^ • • * ' " i * 
r e c o r c | ^iai jS n o w b e f o r e this Court. A c c o r d i n g ii is well established that on appeal this 
Coi II t accords absolute!1, I D deference or weight lo an\ of the factual de t e rmina t ion or 
interpretat ions of
 t|.v .;i. ,u. : .;>. • . ^ ; M ; H \. . ^ u - ; . o a , r - . . o :• l 
1 9 9 6 ) "•• -' •• • '"" " • - ' - < r !-• :. /a. 
Moreover , the City ha^ the b u r d c : of p-"< j Al though a landowner l\pi a]]} has the 
burden of pi oving entit lement to riglits based on a nonconforming use, once the 
noi icot ift: u t i iti ig i isc 1 ,as 1 : >e ei i. t :stablif ;1 ied, "[t]l n : bi r :ic I • : .f f it. ovii ig tei i t ii. • uitic u: • : f a 
nonconforming use by abandonment or discontinuance is on the party urging termination of 
the s ta tus ." New Orleans v. Elms, 566 So. 2d 626, 634 (I a. 1990). Here both the City and 
\i\- [)[ ,! ; io i i)unt agree tl lat tl le Golden Eagle ' s oil reclai i iati.01 I bi isii less is a legal 
, - • • , .- • ' •
 ! 1
" -
 ]
 v — •• !-. — nailer "Add.") , 
at 6 (District Court opinion, . 1 has, the City has the binder* of proving the termination of a 
<N 
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( 
portion of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use. 
I 
II. Utah Law Construes Zoning Ordinances Narrowly; Broad Statements of Intent 
Cannot Substitute For The Substantive Provisions Of The Ordinance. 
The District Court repeatedly invoked the City Ordinance's general statement that its 
< 
purpose was to "eliminate" nonconforming uses, and then rejected any reading of the 
Ordinance that might allow a nonconforming use to continue. See Brf. App., pp. 47-49; Add. 
atlO, 13-14. In its opening brief, Golden Eagle argued that the District Court's interpretation * 
of the Ordinance was erroneous: despite the broad statement of intent, the actual provisions 
of the Ordinance indicate that the City has chosen not to eliminate nonconfomiing uses but . 
rather to allow them to continue, even perpetually, under certain restrictions.1 Brf. App., pp. 
18-19, 48-49. Golden Eagle then demonstrated that under a reasonable and fair reading of 
i 
the various provisions of the Ordinance, installation of the Certified Tanks was permitted. 
Id. at 20-47. 
On appeal, the City predictably commences its argument with a plea for the broadest % 
'It is well established that inconsistency with a general statement of intent does not 
constitute violation of an ordinance. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 j 
P.2d 602, 610 (Utah App. 1995) ("By satisfying the actual regulations enumerated in [the 
ordinance], the proposed [land use] has met the legal requirements of that section. We 
will not find a violation of law simply because the Board's decision may seem 
inconsistent with the general intent statement found in [the ordinance] when it is in 
compliance with the substantive provisions of that ordinance.") (emphasis added); Brown 4 
v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1998) ("Sections 15-7-3(a) and 
15- 7-5(a) of the Code crepresent[] [only] the broad goal sought to be achieved by the 
[city] in enacting regulations governing' uses of properties in these zones. Through the 
purpose declaration, Sandy explained what its goal was in establishing the residential 
zones. It then enumerated specific regulations to meet that goal. 'By satisfying the actual * 
regulations enumerated in [ §§ 15-7-3 (b)(2) and 15-7- 5 (b)(2)J the [use of the properties] 
has met the legal requirements of those sections,' and, thus, met the general purpose of 
the statute") (bracketed language in original; citations omitted; emphasis added). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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possible reading of the restrictions in the City's nonconforming use Ordinance and, 
< '•-•-••, • . • . . . . . . .neii Lagi-^  s common law property 
rights. See City Brf., pp. 6-8. "I he Cm v- >.<. ;» • i — d y . •-,•!.• Ins 
are sufficient! diminished . ..i iln- < ir 's powers sufficiently expanded then the decision 
bcjuw can he ju.Miik-i; i Sowever, Utah's courts have never adopted this approach. In fact, 
as in 1 iiiifiy Slai a ;, i i; u ; ia < > in i h:ai i is qi irlj 11! ic opposite. It i ;.:ie• :>d ii i, a i • : cei it cas 3 ii i ' : 1 < dng 
the City itself (nlcluding its present counsel) and a nonconforming use issue, this Court 
reiterated the established standard ii; \ Mali for interpreting all zoning ordinances: 
Moreover, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner!s 
common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein 
restricting property uses should be strictly construed . . . in favor of the 
property owner." Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 
606 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 1999 UT App 281. at €| 8, 988 P.2d 456 (emphasis addedV see 
ciLst : • Bt < iwn v. Sandy City Boa) < ioj \ it ijustnu mt, > . w g 
same language from Patterson). Using this established rule of construction, tllis Court in 
Hugoe read the City's nonconforming use Ordinance permissively so as to allow the property 
owner to conti:ui< its noncoi..<.-;..ringuse, rejecting the < ..{\ •» hyper-teciinica! arguments to 
tl le :ontrai ;; - 1/999 1 1" I N px M'M 12 I lie ( "ity igi 101 es tl us loi lg-stai idii ig I Jtal i stan ilard 
and instead directs the Court to numerous decisions from other jurisdictions. See City Brf., 
pp. 6-7. Given I Jtah's established rule of interpretation, such cases are wholly inapposite. 
Moi eovei , I I'tal f 's appi oacl i is coi lsistei it \ itl I i i lai ly otl lei ji irisdictioi is ^ d licl: ii ecogi lize tl lat 
zoning ordinances are in derogation of the common law and therefore n lust be < :onsti i led in 
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favor of the property owner. 
( 
i 
2In re: Fairhope Bd. of Adj. and Appeals, 567 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Ala. 1990) 
("land use restrictions are to be strictly construed in favor of the landowner"); Tillery v. 
Meadows Construction Co., 681 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Ark. 1984) ("zoning laws must be 
strictly construed in favor of the property owner"); Cardillo v. South Bethany, No. 86A-
N02, 86C-OC23, 86M-OC8, 1991 De. Super. LEXIS 222, at *8 (Del. Super. 1991) 
("zoning ordinances . . . must be construed in case of doubt in favor of the unrestricted 
use of the land"); Thomas v. Crescent City, 503 So.2d 1299, 1301 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987) 
("zoning ordinances should be given their broadest meaning when there is no definition < 
or clear intent to the contrary and the ordinance should be interpreted in favor of the 
property owner"); DeKalb Co. v. Post Apartment Homes, L.P., 506 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1998) ("Georgia follows a majority of states in holding that zoning ordinances 
should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, and ambiguities in the 
language of zoning ordinances should be resolved in favor of the free use of property."); i 
State v. hum, 807 P.2d 40, 43 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) ("Zoning ordinances are in 
derogation of the common law, and their provisions must be strictly construed."); 
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Village of Inverness, 735 N.E.2d 686, 691 (111. App. Ct. 
2000) ("The language in zoning ordinances should be interpreted in favor of the free use 
of property."); Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) { 
("Zoning ordinances care in derogation of the common law' . . . and should be strictly 
construed in favor of the property owner."); New Orleans v. Benchabbat, 566 So. 626, 
633 (La. 1990) ("A zoning ordinance . . . must be construed, when subject to more than 
one reasonable interpretation, according to the interpretation which allows the least 
restricted use of the property."); Forest City v. Payson, 239 A.2d 167, 169 (Me. 1968) 
("A zoning ordinance, like any other statute which is in derogation of the common law, 
must be strictly construed."); Township of Fremont v. McGarvie, 417 N.W.2cl 560, 562 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) ("the language [of a land use ordinance] must be interpreted, 
where doubt exists, in favor of the property owner"); Chanhassen Estates Residents ^ 
Assoc, v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. 1984) ("a zoning ordinance is 
in derogation of the common law and should be construed strictly against the city and in 
favor of the property owner."); Whistler v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 741 P.2d 422, 425 
(Mont. 1987) ("since zoning laws and ordinances are in derogation of the common law 
right to free use of private property, such ordinances should be strictly construed."); ( 
Zickefoose v. Bd. of Zoning App. Green Township, No. 99-COA-01307, 2000 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 4122, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2000) (zoning ordinances "must be strictly 
construed in favor of the property owner, and 'the scope of restrictions cannot be 
extended to include limitations not clearly prescribed.'"); City of Tulsa v. Mizel, 265 P.2d 
496, 498 (Okla. 1953) ("Zoning ordinances . . .will be strictly construed and any i 
ambiguity or uncertainty decided in favor of property owners."); Sunnyside Up Corp. v. 
City of Lancaster Zoning Hearing Bd., 739 A.2d 644, 648 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) 
("where a term in a zoning ordinance is undefined, an ambiguity in that term must be Digitized by the Howard W. H nter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In short, under Utah law, the Ordinance n rust be "strictly c<msirue<*" 'a fr ; of 
(iulden Eagle and against lit*. «' 'il); any ambiguits is therefore interpreted in ao ia oi i - lea 
Eagle. The City cannot retreat to broad expire •.•:' •• .* •- - <,--; 
provisions of the Ordinance do not contemplate. 
TT r
 i lie C,'it> 1 ails 1 o Address 1 he Fact That Golden Eagle's Operations-Including 
Jls Stora<je Tanks - Are A Single Nonconforming Use. 
1 he court below interpreted the ( )rdh iai ice so as t 3 i endei tl ic Old I ai iks a sepai ate 
and distinct nonconforming use that could be eliminated after a year of alleged nonuse, rather 
than as an integral par* of :^  ~< ;^ larger nonconforming use. Golden Eagle argued '• i;; 
( i " ' ' ' , , i ' K o { - j •; . a n a n e e \ 
which would essentially allow the City to dismantle Golden Eagle's noriconn ' a ig u.sc hoi! 
by bolt. See Brf A pp. pp. 20-22. 
On appeal, tl ic City essentially ignores this enl^.n p^nit iur ob\ ions reasons, This 
( ' / , . v : - * ' • , ' 
lieu. In Ilugoc, the City argued "that since the subject y- -pe^v [\\:\s beina! Msedmerel> for 
storage and parkin:?, it [\V;K"! »-.ot being used [for the h.yu' nonconforming use of] transfer 
con lpai i) activ ities" ' ai id tl: n is : ais i lot a 1( 7a, 1.i...cl i IOI ic oi ifoi n i.ii ig i ise. 1999 t J I App. ]\ 9 ' 1 1 i.e 
Com t "rejected] this argument," reasoning that u[:lhe use of the r--wr*. ; - •• < 
construed in Euor o{ the use proposed b> the property lAMier""); Dcnoitunc \. Mown'., 557 
A.2d 1229, 12 •* AA \ 9:^ 9 i i ' \ \c are rcuuircd to resoE i al'doubts and ambiguities in'he 
zoning laws in favor oi the landowner^'). State v. City o1 \ashvilU\ 34? S.W 2d 847, S50 
(Tenn. 1061 > ("because [zoning ordinances] deprive the owner of property use ofhis land 
which would otherwise be lawful, are to be strictly construed in favor of the property 
owner"). 
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storage, and staging activities is an integral part in the operation of a transfer company" as 
opposed to a separate nonconforming use. Id. (citing Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake 
City, 431 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held that 
the property owner "[was] entitled to continue such use under the new ordinance as a valid 
nonconforming use." Id. 
The same is plainly true here: use of storage tanks containing used petroleum product 
"is an integral part" of the overall operation of Golden Eagle's unquestionably legal 
nonconforming use - not a separate and distinct use. Factories and operations like Golden 
Eagle's often consist of many interconnected component parts that form the single coherent 
whole which constitutes the nonconforming use. The Court should not interpret the 
Ordinance in a way that would allow for each piece of the integrated whole to be sliced off 
because, for whatever reason, it has not been used for one year. Such a reading would 
produce clearly arbitrary and absurd results. By that rationale, for instance, the portion of 
a nonconforming factory containing equipment for fire-fighting activities would cease to be 
part of the legal nonconforming use unless utilized once a year - even if there had been no 
need. 
Removing the Old Storage Tanks and replacing them with the Certified Tanks did not 
constitute a cessation in any way of Golden Eagle's single nonconforming use. The District 
Court's decision should be reversed on this ground alone. 
IV. The Storage Tanks Were Continuously In Use. 
The City's principal argument is that because "Golden Eagle put no new material into 
the storage tanks" and did not "remove any material from those tanks" for more than a year 
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it necessarily follows that the tanks ceased to be "in use" within the meaning of § 12-22-106 
< • ' e i: ;•',::,.• r \..^\\\: uru aies o. , ;. us < .-i/l > 
conimonsense 1lolding in \ ; . . ' " '. '» ! / ;* i "* ; 
1995), tl mt witl ). respect to storage tanks like those at issue here, a tank "need only be used 
to store or contain petroleum in order to be 'in I ise '" rrf "t 217, Quoting the District Court, 
tl le City coi ltei ids tl lat tl lis Coi u t 's logical ai id sti aigl i.ti: c i 1( eai d readii ig of tl ic tei n I " "ii 11 ise ' ' 
iii \ -7 Oil is not " 'necessari ly . . . conclusive in detcrnnmnL r when an oil storage tank is in 
fact being u s e d " under the Ordinance because such a reading would eon:li<a v ; w the 
< jp'iuanec\> bi^^i statement of purpose. ^ \\: .-;i;.. i i. e juonng i ,^ t ; ;W . I • ..'i -
(I •- •* ' o n ) . 
rI his argument utterly fails. First, the most natural reading of tlle term "iii use" in the 
Ordinance is the one this Court followed \\\ V '• a storage tank is in use when it is storing 
v i \\ was d e i g n e d i.» si-, i . . ^eeo:. ;. . • e ean possi;.o> demonstrate is t i .anhe 
extent that is >• 'in: i c m mu-a he "sti icily construe. . ... la \o i of the properly ovhe r . ' 
Patterson, y)} \ .d ,w o< . .he ('u_v w ,shes \o define "in use" in ways that conflict with 
b :)tli tl it: i i lost set isible i n idei stai idii ig of tl lat tt: i: i i i ai id j : List precedei it ::>f t l lis C : i n t, it i i n ist 
do so expressly. As a matter of elemental due process, land owners cannot be stripped of 
thee property rights hv government officials giving iinnecessarily harsh interpretations to 
anuagu e • a • 
1liird, it taken seriously, the Ci iv ! ; argument pr- - e , '' -..;- e1 !• -•••* •• * 
even the C i ^ :s unwilling to de luuh 1 lie City denounces as a "'ridiculous 
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mischaracterization" any suggestion that its position would require a legal nonconforming 
business to rotate its stored inventory or materials at least once a year. City Brf, p. 12. 
"Nowhere," the City protests, "has [it] argued for the District Court or this Court to adopt a 
rule which would require inventories to be rotated." Id. Nevertheless, that is precisely what 
the City's extremely cramped reading of the term "in use" would require. How else under 
the City's rigid interpretation could a nonconforming warehouse, for instance, maintain its 
status as a nonconforming use? The owner would have no choice but to do exactly what the 
City faults Golden Eagle for not doing: put "new material" into the warehouse and "remove 
[some] material from" it at least once a year, i.e., rotate the inventory in the warehouse. Cf. 
City Brf, p. 11. Such a position is indeed "ridiculous," but it necessarily follows from the 
City's own argument. 
Finally, as noted above, the City's assertion that the Old Tanks "played no part in 
[Golden Eagle's] operations from at least 1993 to the present" and thus were not "in use" is 
a distortion based on a play on words. Golden Eagle's "operations" include the storage of 
unrecyclable petroleum products for ultimate disposal. See Brf. App, pp. 6-7. That was the 
"part" which those tanks "played" in Golden Eagle's "operations;" that was the use to which 
they were put. There is nothing in the Ordinance remotely suggesting that storage - to which 
entire businesses are devoted - cannot be a valid use. 
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the tanks can be considered a discrete 
nonconforming use within Golden Eagle's overall legal nonconforming use, the City's 
argument that the tanks were not "in use" for more than a year is without merit. 
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V. The Removal Of The Old Storage Tanks To Comply With State Environmental 
Regulations Did Not Constitute A "Cessation of Use9' Under The Woods Cross 
City Ordinance, 
There is no dispute that the Old Storage Tanks did not comply with State 
environmental regulations and that Golden Eagle was legally required to bring its operations 
into compliance with State law. However, the City argues that because Golden Eagle could 
have complied with State regulations by simply destroying its storage tanks, it was not really 
"required" to replace them. City Brf, pp. 15-16. In fact, as set forth above in the Reply to 
Factual Misstatements, supra, Golden Eagle's clean-up efforts were closely monitored and 
regulated by the Department of Environmental Quality. The City's bald assertion that State 
regulations had "nothing to do" with the installation of the Certified Tanks is manifestly 
false. See City Brf., p. 16. 
Admittedly, the City's draconian logic is true in a trivial sense. Golden Eagle could 
indeed have complied with the State's dictates for cleaning up the Property by simply 
shutting down its entire operations, or removing whatever portion of its operations was in 
violation of State law. That is nearly always true of business, health, safety, and 
environmental regulations. One can always ensure that a car does not violate State emissions 
standards by junking it, as opposed to replacing a faulty exhaust system. A store owner can 
always comply with regulations requiring businesses to install wheelchair ramps by simply 
shutting down the business. 
But such sophistry does not change the fact that when Golden Eagle fixed the problem 
with the tanks in the manner approved by State regulators, it did so under compulsion of 
State law and not voluntarily. As argued in the opening brief, the rule that has emerged from 
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the cases is that as long as the replacement structure is on "substantially the same scale" as 
the previous one, the owner has the right to replace a nonconforming structure to comply 
with State regulations. See Brf. App., pp. 30-33. There is no evidence suggesting that 
Golden Eagle's operations would not remain on substantially the same scale after installation 
of the Certified Tanks. In fact, Golden Eagle's physical storage capacity would decrease (by 
86,000 gallons) as would the total number of storage tanks (by eleven). 
Needless to say, the City's harsh approach finds no support in the case law dealing 
with analogous situations. As discussed in the opening brief, the court in Application and 
Appeal of O'Neal, 92 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1956), addressed a situation where State regulators 
informed the owners of a nursing home, a legal nonconforming use, that they would not be 
allowed to continue operations unless they complied with the new State building code. Id. 
at 191. Of course, one way for the owners to have complied would have been to cease to use 
the building as a nursing home; in fact, instead of being torn down the building was 
ultimately used for other related activities not barred by the building code, so that approach 
was not out of the question. Nevertheless, the court reversed the city's denial of a permit to 
replace the old nursing home with a new one because the necessity of constructing a new 
building was "not by reason of their choice or voluntary act, but [was] necessary to meet the 
requirements of [State law]." Id. at 195. The court allowed the owners "as a matter of right" 
to construct a new structure that complied with State building standards provided it was "on 
substantially the same scale as [the building] in operation when the [zoning] ordinance was 
adopted." Id. at 195-96. This approach ensured that the nonconforming use was not 
extended or enlarged, while allowing the owners to comply with State law. Thus, the 
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decision in O'Neal essentially rejects the City's approach, which presumably would have 
resulted in an affirmation of the permit denial on the ground that the nursing home owners 
could have complied with State law by simply shutting down the building entirely or using 
it for other permissible activities. 
The City's rule would also have changed the outcome in A. L. Carrithers & Son v. 
City of Louisville, 63 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1933). There, health regulators required the owner 
of a nonconforming milk plant to make certain structural additions and alterations or else lose 
its grade "A" rating. Id. at 495. Much as in this case, zoning authorities in A L. Carrithers 
denied the necessary permit on the grounds that the new construction (1) would "materially 
increase[] the size of the building"; (2) would "indefinitely prolong[] the life of a non-
conforming use"; and (3) would be "contrary to the purpose and intent of the zoning 
ordinance." Id. However, rather than strictly enforce the nonconforming use ordinance (as 
the City here presumably would) on the basis that the owner was still free to make grade "B" 
milk products - or even shut down its operations altogether - the court held that the two sets 
of regulations could not be "enforced so that the one [regulation] may require 'structural 
alterations' to fulfill its requirements, [while] the other [regulation] prohibits]" the very 
thing that is required. Id. at 497. Given the circumstances, the court rejected as "unsound 
and untenable" the argument that allowing the plant to modernize would "prolong the life of 
the plant indefinitely, materially increase the size of the building and would be contrary to 
the purpose and intent of the zoning act." Id. The additions and alterations were "simply a 
compliance with the requirements of the ordinance regulating the retailing and handling of 
milk at [the] plant in accordance with the demands of the chief inspector of the health 
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department." Id. 
Suffice it to say, the City's argument is as "unsound and untenable" as the 
municipality's argument in A L. Carrithers. Golden Eagle had a right to comply with State 
regulations without being punished by the City. That only makes sense. The rule in 0 'Neal 
provides a reasonable, balanced approach that supports important land use goals but does not 
strip landowners of their nonconforming use when they are forced to comply with important 
State health, safety, or environmental regulations. The City's approach should be rejected 
as subversive of both the vested rights of property owners and the State's interest in securing 
compliance with its regulations.3 
VI. The Certified Tanks Did Not Enlarge, Extend, or Change Golden Eagle's 
Nonconforming Use And Therefore Must Be Permitted Under the Ordinance. 
Golden Eagle has already set forth at great length why, under reigning standards, 
replacement of the Old Tanks with the Certified Tanks did not constitute an enlargement, 
extension, or change of its overall nonconforming use, and thus why the Certified Tanks 
must be permitted under the City's Ordinance., SeeBrf. App.,pp. 35-42. In its brief, the City 
basically ignores that analysis and the substantial case law from other jurisdictions which 
3The cases the City cites do not support its position. See City Brf, pp. 14-15. In 
Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., Inc., 179 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. App. 1944), the court stated 
that "[i]t would not have been difficult for [the landowner] to have made his plans comply 
with the [regulations] of the health department without replacing the wooden exterior 
walls of his plant with brick thereby converting it into a new and different structure." Id. 
at 209. By contrast, here it is undisputed that Golden Eagle could not have repaired the 
Old Storage Tanks so as to comply with State regulations; they had to be replaced. R. 
App. at 84, 103. The decision in Mossman v. City ofColombus, 449 N.W.2d 214 (Ne. 
1989), is plainly inapposite because it did not address the situation where a landowner 
faces the loss of a nonconforming use because of compliance with State or other 
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directly conflicts with its position. It makes no attempt to refute the case law establishing 
that, within reasonable limits, increasing the volume or intensity of a nonconforming use is 
not a prohibited "enlargement" of that use. Id. The City pays no attention to the eminently 
reasonable three-part test set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Derby 
Refining Company v. City of Chelsea, 555 N.E.2d 534 (Mass. 1990), for determining whether 
there has been an extension of a nonconforming use. See Brf. App., pp. 38-40. Nor does the 
City deny that there is absolutely no evidence that the Certified Tanks will impose any 
additional impact on the Property or the neighboring properties, much less that the nature or 
character of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will be substantially changed. In fact, all 
the evidence suggests the very opposite. 
To all this, the City's response is simply that "Golden Eagle's installation of the 
Certified Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity." 
City Brf, p. 20. This argument fails on every possible level. 
First, as explained above, the assertion is factually incorrect. Actual storage capacity 
will decrease by 86,000 gallons as a result of the installation of the Certified Tanks when 
compared to the capacity of the Old Tanks. The City's insistence to the contrary rests on the 
totally spurious argument that since the District Court found that the Old Tanks had ceased 
to be in use under the Ordinance because they had been removed from the Property, when 
the Certified Tanks were installed they increased the storage capacity above what it was 
without the Old Tanks. City Brf, p. 21. This argument begs the entire question of whether 
the District Court was correct in its conclusion that there was a cessation of use because 
Golden Eagle removed the Old Tanks to install others that complied with State law -
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obviously a central issue in this case. Moreover, the argument is absurd: the Court cannot 
i 
just ignore the capacity of the Old Tanks when ascertaining whether replacement tanks 
constitute an expansion of the nonconforming use of which the Old Tanks were an integral 
part.4 ( 
Second, the City's argument misses the point entirely. Even assuming arguendo that 
the Certified Tanks increased Golden Eagle's storage capacity, that does not answer the 
question whether such an increase constitutes an enlargement or extension of the 
nonconforming use under § 12-22-104 of the Ordinance. See Add. at 2. The City merely 
assumes that an increase in storage capacity automatically equals an unlawful enlargement 
of the nonconforming use.5 But as demonstrated in Golden Eagle's opening brief, under the 
standards established in cases like Derby, supra, and Keller v. City ofBellingham, 600 P.2d 
1276 (Wash. 1979), courts do not merely make such assumptions but rather inquire into the 
facts of the situation to determine the actual impact of the proposed change. That is precisely 
what the court did in Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 320 
4The City also argues that because the Old Tanks were not in compliance with 
State regulations, their capacity must be ignored and any effort to remedy the problem 
necessarily increases the storage capacity. City Brf, p. 19. By this rationale, Golden 
Eagle would have expanded its nonconforming use had it been able to fix the problem by 
simply patching the Old Tanks, since that would have brought noncompliant tanks into 
compliance. This illustrates well the City's strategy of dismantling legal nonconforming 
uses bolt by bolt. Neither State law, the Ordinance, nor case law from other jurisdictions 
countenances such an arbitrary approach. 
5The City's precise language is: "[I]n this case, Golden Eagle's installation of the 
Certified Tanks will increase the storage capacity of the plant from its previous capacity. 
Therefore, installation of the Certified Tanks represents an unlawful enlargement of the 
nonconforming use as determined by the District Court." City Brf, p. 20 (emphasis 
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(N.Y. App. Div. 1998), on which the City relies. City Brf., p. 20. Based on the facts, it 
concluded that the proposed change "would increase the volume and scope of the business" 
and thus was improper. Id. at 322. 
No such evidence has been adduced here. Indeed, all evidence indicates that the 
overall impact of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use will decrease due to the installation of 
the Certified Tanks. Under the Ordinance, installation of the Certified Tanks did not 
constitute a prohibited enlargement or extension of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use. 
VII. In The Alternative, The Certified Tanks Must Be Allowed As An Accessory Use. 
Under the Ordinance, a "use which is incidental to and subordinate to the prescribed 
permitted use" is pennitted as an accessory use. Woods Cross City Ordinances § 12-2-103 
(emphasis added). In its opening brief, Golden Eagle demonstrated why, in the alternative, 
the Certified Tanks should be allowed as an accessory use. Brf. App., pp. 42-47. 
In response, the City concedes that "Golden Eagle's use of the Certified Tanks may 
very well be incidental and subordinate to the primary use on the Property," but then argues 
that nevertheless the Certified Tanks are not pemiitted under the Ordinance because Golden 
Eagle failed to use its tanks for more than a year. City Brf, p. 17. This argument mixes 
apples and oranges. The accessory use issue is separate from the abandonment issue; they 
are two distinct analyses. Golden Eagle's accessory use argument is made in the alternative: 
in the event the Court decides that the Certified Tanks are not permitted as an integral part 
of Golden Eagle's nonconforming use, the Court should find that the Certified Tanks are 
nevertheless permissible as a use that is accessory to the nonconforming use. The issue of 
abandonment is therefore irrelevant, since (as an alternative argument) Golden Eagle is 
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essentially seeking permission to install an entirely new (accessory) use. The City's analysis 
conflates these very separate inquires. 
As set forth in the opening brief, installation of the Certified Tanks easily meets the 
five relevant factors for identifying an accessory use. See Brf. App., pp. 43-44. In its brief, 
the City never addresses these factors nor disputes Golden Eagle's conclusion that the 
Certified Tanks are "incidental to and subordinate to" its larger nonconforming use. 
The City relies on Gilchrist v. Town of Lake George Planning Board, 680 N.Y.S.2d 
320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998), but to no avail. In Gilchrist, the court addressed whether 
installation of a new gasoline tank, double the size of the old one, at a nonconforming marina 
was "truly incidental to the nonconforming use and does not change the basic nature of the 
use of the property." Id. at 322 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis 
added). The proposed "accessory use" failed this test because, as extensive testimony at 
public hearings established, the new tank would in fact "change the basic nature" of the 
marina, increasing "the volume and the scope of the business of the marina as it has existed." 
Id. The court found this to be "an expansion and enlargement of the original use of the 
property as a marina" that would "violate[] the provisions of the zoning ordinance." Id. In 
other words, the new tank would not be accessory to the nonconforming use but rather an 
expansion of that use. In dicta, the court stated that because there had been no sale of 
gasoline for the last 15 years, the use of selling gasoline had also been abandoned. Id. By 
contrast, here there is no evidence that the Certified Tanks will in any way change the nature 
of Golden Eagle's oil reclamation activities; there is no evidence the volume and scope of 
Golden Eagle's business will change; the undisputed evidence has established that the 
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combined capacity of the Certified Tanks is smaller, not larger, than what they will replace; 
and there is no evidence that Golden Eagle has abandoned the use of storing petroleum in 
tanks for recycling or ultimate disposal. Gilchrist does not support the City's cause. 
The District Court's ruling on accessory use, which was based on a factual mistake 
regarding increased capacity and invocation of the "spirit of the zoning act" (Add. at 20), was 
erroneous. To the extent the Court rejects the argument that storage of used petroleum 
product is an inseparable part of Golden Eagle's overall nonconforming use (and thus fully 
permissible as such), it is beyond serious debate that the storage of used oil is reasonably 
related to, incidental to, and subordinate to the primary activity of recycling oil. Again, even 
the City essentially concedes that point. See City Brf, p. 17 ("... use of the Certified Tanks 
may very well be incidental and subordinate to the primary use on the Property . . . . " ) . 
Accordingly, in the alternative, Golden Eagle is entitled to store used petroleum products in 
the Certified Tanks as an accessory use. 
VIII. The Rule Golden Eagle Proposes Is Narrow And Will Not Materially Disrupt 
The City's Land Use Goals. 
Finally, it bears repeating that upholding Golden Eagle's right to install the Certified 
Tanks will not materially disrupt the City's land use goals nor set a precedent that will 
undermine appropriate land use planning in other jurisdictions. Under compulsion of State 
law and at great expense, Golden Eagle replaced seventeen environmentally unsound storage 
tanks with six newer ones that (1) satisfied the demands of State law, (2) reduced the overall 
storage capacity of its operations, and (3) reduced the visual and environmental impact on 
neighboring properties. Reversing the District Court under these narrow facts and pursuant 
-91-
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to the well reasoned standards set out in 0 'Neal, Derby, and the other cases relied on by 
Golden Eagle in its opening brief, will in no way undermine appropriate land use planning 
objectives. Affirming the decision below, by contrast, will only discourage others from 
making the type of effort which Golden Eagle has made to clean up a bad situation and 
operate an environmentally sound - and much needed - business. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in the Brief of Appellant, Golden Eagle 
respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be reversed and that summary 
judgment be entered in its favor. 
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